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Add Apport Symlink Hijacking: CVE-2020-8831 #20037
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I've accidentally committed pushes from another module. My apologizes, I am unsure of the proper way to remove these. |
No problem; git is really awesome, but not always super intuitive. It looks like the unwanted commits are all related to your previous game overlay module.
Last, if you want, let me know and I am pretty sure I can fix it for you, but you might lose some commits. The only file you need here is |
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Yes, I only want the files relevant to this module pushed. I just added the rebase let me know if it is sufficient. |
Looks good! Let us know when you'd like us to review it. |
modules/exploits/linux/local/cve_2020_8831_apport_symlink_privesc.rb
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modules/exploits/linux/local/cve_2020_8831_apport_symlink_privesc.rb
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modules/exploits/linux/local/cve_2020_8831_apport_symlink_privesc.rb
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modules/exploits/linux/local/cve_2020_8831_apport_symlink_privesc.rb
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modules/exploits/linux/local/cve_2020_8831_apport_symlink_privesc.rb
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) | ||
) | ||
register_options [ | ||
OptString.new('WRITABLE_DIR', [true, 'A directory we can write to.', '/tmp']), |
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For local exploit modules, this is usually registered as an advanced option:
register_advanced_options [
OptString.new('WritableDir', [true, 'A directory where we can write files', '/tmp'])
]
modules/exploits/linux/local/cve_2020_8831_apport_symlink_privesc.rb
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modules/exploits/linux/local/cve_2020_8831_apport_symlink_privesc.rb
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…esc.rb Co-authored-by: bcoles <[email protected]>
…esc.rb Co-authored-by: bcoles <[email protected]>
…esc.rb Co-authored-by: bcoles <[email protected]>
…esc.rb Co-authored-by: bcoles <[email protected]>
…esc.rb Co-authored-by: bcoles <[email protected]>
…esc.rb Co-authored-by: bcoles <[email protected]>
…esc.rb Co-authored-by: bcoles <[email protected]>
@gardnerapp any update? Are you still working on this? Anything we can do to help? |
Hello, I've been working on other things sorry for the delay. I wasn't sure where the symlink hijacking should occur, if you read my first comment I talk about it more there. Can't use |
I'm going to try and finish this next week sorry for the delay just wanted to keep you updated. |
I haven't forgotten about this. I'm able to create a root owned file w 777 perms named lock not sure what to do with it. Also I'm creating a container to help with testing. |
@gardnerapp, I'm sorry I completely missed the requests. |
Yes sir, I've been working on other modules and have been stumped on this one for quiet some time. I've tried writing a cron but Ubuntu wont execute crons w 777 permissions, and I can't change the permissions because the file is owned by root. I've been thinking about going through the other places to persist but haven't gotten to it. Thanks for getting back to me. |
Could we create a |
My first thought was cron and something in rc.d, but if you've tried that, we'll need to dig a bit deeper. I've tossed this out to the greater hive mind, and they will likely have some thoughts, too. |
#19815 may give you persistence ideas. |
The exploit creates a file owned by root:root with the name of lock and 777 permissions. In order to avoid having to re-write the exploit for every single persistence directory I'm going to create this file manually. Every exploit will execute /etc/cron.d
cron won't execute because of insecure perms :/ |
/etc/init.d
As ubuntu user I get |
This pull request is a draft for CVE-2020-8831, I originally came across this vulnerability while reading From Day Zero to Zero Day, which I highly recommend. The long story short is that certain versions of apport will follow symbolic links when writing crash dumps. This file will have a mask of 777 and be owned by root. In this module I used the command
ln -s /cron.d /var/lock/apport
so that a/etc/cron.d/lock
crontab file would be created. This crontab should execute a payload every minute which was located in the/tmp
directory.After scratching my head for several hours and combing through the log files I found that the crontab would not execute because it's file permissions were too excessive. We need to find another place for the symlink hijacking to occur. I have a few places in mind namely
/etc/init.d/
or~/.bashrc
which would trigger the payload upon startup. I am submitting this because I am unsure of which route to go or if there are other places where the symlink hijacking should occur. Thank you !